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Belief and Practice in the Unified Germanies1 
by Michael Terwey and Allan L. McCutcheon2 
Zusammenfassung 
Gegen Ende des Mittelalters wurde die Christenheit in Westeuropa mit der protestanti-
schen Reformation konfrontiert. Heute müssen sich die Christen - wiederum in Deutsch-
land - mit einem weiteren krisenträchtigen Phänomen zunehmend vertraut machen: Der 
prinzipiellen Ablehnung des traditionellen christlichen Glaubens. In diesem Beitrag 
werden zunächst die in Westdeutschland längerfristig feststellbare Verringerung von konfes-
sioneller Mitgliedschaft und der Rückgang des Kirchenbesuchs für verschiedene Kohorten 
beschrieben. Der Zeitraum für diese Untersuchung ist 1953 bis 1992. Der zweite Abschnitt 
konzentriert sich auf einen Ost- West- Vergleich für die ersten Jahre nach der deutschen Ver-
einigung. Die Autoren zeigen, daß der Sozialismus in der DDR zu einem außerordentlich 
starken Rückgang von kirchlicher Partizipation und religiösen Einstellungen geführt hat. 
Vergleichbar hohe Schwächungen traditioneller Religiosität konnten bisher in keinem ande-
ren Land mit Erhebungsdaten belegt werden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden die Untersuchun-
gen auf alternative Glaubensformen ausgedehnt. Glücksbringer, Wunderheiler, Wahrsager 
und Horoskope werden immer noch von einem großen Bevölkerungsteil akzeptiert, ohne 
daß ein grundlegender Ost- West-Unterschied zu beobachten ist. Dies gilt sogar für Befrag-
te in der jüngsten Kohorte. Weitere Analysen befassen sich mit den potentiellen Beziehun-
gen zwischen Glauben an Gott, kirchlicher Partizipation und alternativen Glaubensformen. 
Abstract 
At the end of the Middle Ages, Western Christianity was confronted with the Protestant Ref-
ormation. Today, and again in Germany, modern Western Christianity may be preparing to 
confront another major crisis — the rejection of traditional Christian belief. The first part 
of the article focuses on church membership and church attendance in the Western parts of 
Germany. It describes how far "unchurching" has progressed among the various cohorts. 
Observations start in 1953 and end in 1992. The second section contains an East-West 
comparison of recent religious participation and attitudes in the new and old federal 
states. The authors show that the socialist influences experienced in the former GDR led to 
1 This article is based on a Paper presented by Allan L. McCutcheon and Michael Terwey at a seminar of 
the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University of Cologne, November 23, 1993 
2 Professor Allan L. McCutchon, Ph. D.,Dept. of Sociology, 311 Smith Hall, University of Delaware, 
Newark, Delaware 19716 
an extraordinarily high degree of explicitly unchurched people in Eastern Germany. This 
result is unparalleled in the other formerly socialist countries for which we have survey 
data. Finally, alternative forms of belief are investigated. These are beliefs in good luck 
charms, faith healers, fortune tellers, and horoscopes. Such alternative forms of belief ap-
parently still persist in Germany today, irrespective of the East-West differentiation. They 
can even be found in the youngest cohorts. Further investigations focus on some of the 
potential relations between Christian and alternative beliefs. 
1. Differing Church Attachments in the Federal Republic of Germany 1953 -1992 
About four centuries ago in Germany, Western Christianity confronted a major crisis - the 
Reformation. Today, and again in Germany, modern Western Christianity may be preparing 
to confront its next major crisis — the rejection of church and accepted religious beliefs 
brought on by general secularization, modern pluralism, and by the enduring influences of 
the socialist legacy. Thus, the unified Germany may be poised to repeat its role as a striking 
member among societies in the Christian tradition: There are reasons to believe that Ger-
many is developing toward being one of the first large Western nations which have a popu-
lation majority that is neither churched, nor believing in traditional faiths. Other nations 
may still be even more secularized (e.g. France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium; cf. Zulehner/Denz 1993), but the German unification and the costs of economic 
cutbacks (cf. EKD 1993: 3) may accelerate similar developments in Germany. 
Our empirical investigations start with the questions of how far "unchurching" has pro-
gressed among the various cohorts in the old federal states; observations start in 1953 and 
end in 1992. 3 
The first general chart shows in nearly every respect a very clear pattern of secularization 
or alienation to traditional church. Inspection of the chart suggests, that a large part of this 
"unchurching" process may be attributed to cohort differences. At all of the time-points, 
respondents who were born before 1910 have the smallest percentages of low church 
attendance. Cohorts of 1910-1929, 1930-44, and 1945-1961 show consistent, increasing 
patterns of low church attendance. Only the trend-line for the youngest cohort — those born 
between 1962 and 1974 — shows any exception to the general pattern. This exception of 
comparatively low percentages found in 1982 and 1984 may possibly be the result of the 
small subsample of observations in this cohort at these earlier time-points. Besides, we 
3    We wish to thank the seminar participants for many helpful comments on our presentation. The analyses 
in the first section constitute only a first straightforward step toward a more formal cohort analysis (cf. 
Glenn 1977; Jagodzinski 1984; Hout and Greeley 1987; Mnich 1989). In such a formal analysis the 
separation of age, period, and cohort effects results in more detailed numerical description. 
For 1953 we use the "Reigrotzki"-study. data on 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976 are German National Election 
Studies, 1980 to 1992 are ALLBUS-data (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften). 
shall discuss other explanations for such peculiarities of the youngest people, which 
deserve our close consideration. Certain age effects are also reflected in Chart 1. Even 
though there are some unsystematic sampling variabilities prevailing trends within most 
cohorts can be seen: low church attendance appears to be augmented by age. Some similar 
observations are reported by Jagodzinski/Dobbelaere (1993). 
Chart 1: Low Church Attendance in Different Cohorts 
German Christians in the Old Federal States 
A corresponding pattern of relations between cohorts emerges, when we examine high 
church attendance (cf. Chart 2). With only some minor exceptions, higher degrees of 
church attendance are found in earlier birth cohorts. Percentages tend to decline within co-
horts as their members age. 
We may now ask, whether different patterns have to be drawn for the two "Volkskirchen" 
of Germany (cf.. Chart 3 and 4). When denomination is taken into account, the relations be-
tween cohorts and frequencies of church attendance within each denomination remain simi-
lar to those discussed above. But comparing Catholics and Evangelisch (Lutherans 4 ), it is 
clear that the Evangelisch have consistently lower rates of church attendance. 
Chart 2: High Church Attendance in Different Cohorts 
German Christians in the Old Federal States 
In general the oldest Protestant cohorts show less high church attendance than even the 
most recent cohorts of Catholics. Lower rates of church attendance among Protestants do 
not necessarily indicate lower religiosity. In his "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism" Weber introduced his concept of "disenchantment" (Entzauberung) of the world. Sal-
vation in the tradition of protestant disenchantment is rather reached by personal faith, ac-
tion, and rescue than by ritual participation in church-sacraments, which are often sup-
posed to bear elements of superstition (Weber 1993: 178). Amongst Protestants, church 
practices are much less considered a mediator between the religious individual and God 
(cf. also Jagodzinski/Dobbelaere 1994). There is, however, evidence that on average 
4 We also use the expression "Lutheran" to denote the German "Evangelische Kirche (ohne Freikirchen)", 
even though not all of the smaller churches included in this denominational group explicitly call 
themselves "Lutheran". As we shall show in more detail, the moderately engaged majority of the 
"Evangelische Kirche (ohne Freikirchen)" differs considerably from other churches which are usually 
denoted as "Protestants" or "Evangelical" in English. 
5 An exception is found for 1980 and 1982 between the lines of the pre-1910 Protestants and of the rather 
young 1945-61 Catholics (cf. Chart 3, Chart 4 and McCutcheon/Terwey 1993). It could be interpreted as 
the result of sampling variability, but it could also make some sense that the very oldest Protestant 
cohort has a slightly higher rate of high church attendance than the rather young Catholics. 
6 The consequences of disenchantment can to some extent be applied to the Lutheran denominations, even 
though Weber thought in first line of Protestantism closer to the tradition of Calvin. 
Chart 3: High Church Attendance in Different Cohorts 
German Catholics in the Old Federal States 
Chart 4: High Church attendance in Different Cohorts 
German Protestants in the Old Federal States 
German Lutherans are not only attached to more abstract or less "superstitious" forms of 
belief and practice, but that they are also more alienated to central Christian ideas. This con-
cerns even the belief in God (Terwey 1992: 65). Differing degrees of belief in God are also 
closely related to Protestant church attendance as Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1993: 87 
f.) have shown. On the other hand, as Protestantism is claimed to be more person-centered 
and "disenchanted" than Catholicism, it may be regarded as a more modernized form of re-
ligion and a step in the direction of secularization (Weber 1993: 28; Shiner 1967; Meule-
mann/Birkelbach 1993: 644 f.). 
Charts for low church attendance among Catholics and Protestants depict corresponding 
patterns (cf. McCutcheon/Terwey 1993). A part of the decrease in Catholics' church 
attachment after 1968 has been attributed to the encyclical "Humanae Vitae" (cf. Hout and 
Greeley 1987). The assumption of a "Humanae Vitae"-effect is also consistent with our 
data for German Catholics, particularly for the percentages of low church attendance. In 
general, there is a noticeable increase in low attendance between 1965 and 1969. But as 
Protestant cohort-lines move in a similar direction, there is also some evidence that the al-
ienation from church had also been caused by the more general socio-political process 
which is often called the "1968er Bewegung", which may be regarded as a part of a more 
general movement against affirmative ideologies and institutions ("antiinstitutionelle" Kul-
turrevolution (cf. David 1968; Gabriel 1993; Tyrell 1993)). 
The cohort trends for people who do not belong to any denomination (cf. Chart5) give fur-
ther support to the "de-traditionalization" which we have seen in the data on church atten-
dance. The proportion of the population outside of a "Konfession" has tended to increase. 
In general, the older cohorts have smaller relative frequencies of "Konfessionslosigkeit" 
than the younger ones. Church-membership is also decreasing by age. As can be seen, how-
ever, there appears to be an irregularity for the youngest cohort 1962-1974; until 1991, 
these respondents report lower percentages of "Konfessionslosigkeit" than the cohort 1945-
1961. This particular finding is similar to some results of Andrew Greeley (1993, 1993a). 
Currently, young people may be more attached to some beliefs and churches than those in 
the middle years of life. This higher percentage of belief or ecclesiastical engagement 
among the very youngest people may represent a trend toward decreasing secularization. In 
short, it could be the result of a "returning effect", which is consistent with other signs of 
returning to religion which can presently be observed. There is, however, an alternative ex-
planation which also is plausible and more parsimonious; the comparatively higher degrees 
of churching among the youngest cohort may be attributed to some kind of "family ef-
fect". The very youngest respondents may either still live with their parents, who are likely 
to display more attachment to the churches than the people in the younger cohorts, or they 
are still reflecting the influence of the religious socialization received from their parents. 
Furthermore, the youngest people are less likely to have regularly joined the labor market, 
and labor force participation may - besides the age effects — foster individual seculariza-
tion (e.g. de Vaus 1984; de Vaus and McAllister 1987). 
Chart 5: "Konfessionslos" in Different Cohorts 
Germans in the Old Federal States 
2. The Present Situation of Church and Belief in the Unified Germanies 
The unification of the old federal states and the new federal states of Germany has created 
a situation, which is very challenging. Since there is relatively little survey data about the 
former German Democratic Republic, we must restrict ourselves to the recent develop-
ments for comparisons. 
The first striking feature in Chart 6 is the extraordinarily high degree of explicitly 
unchurched people in Eastern Germany. This result is unparalleled in the other formerly 
socialist countries for which we have survey data (Greeley 1993, 1993b; Terwey 1993). 
Importantly, this devastating loss of membership has disproportionately impacted the 
Lutheran church, which represented the majority faith in the former area of the new federal 
states (80,4% in 1950; cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 1992: 193).7 As we have already noted, 
7     The estimated percentage of Protestants for the ending period of the former GDR (1988) is about 30% 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1992: 193). Most sample data for the following years show slightly lower 
percentages (ALLBUS 1991 27%; ALLBUS 1992 27.3%). 
a large portion of the people belonging to the German Lutherans shows only moderate 
attachment to their church and matters of faith compared to Catholics or some small Ger-
man Protestant denominations. Therefore, Lutherans were more likely to have been more 
susceptible to the secularizing influences of socialist ideology and socialist practices. In 
accordance, the relative decline of church membership has had smaller impact among the 
more limited number of Catholics in the German East than among the Lutherans (Terwey 
1992: 61; Pollack 1993:91). 
Chart 6: "Konfessionslos" -Old and New Länder 1991-1992 (% Konfessionslos) 
The rising numbers of younger "Konfessionslose" are far greater for the people from the 
new federal states. Besides political pressures exerted against church-members, a rather 
materialistic and individualistic orientation among younger people in the former GDR may 
explain these large east-west-differences among the young people (cf. Pollack 1993; see 
however Gensicke 1992). 
We may ask whether German churches are presently losing their function as rather bureau-
cratic "Volkskirchen", who can claim the population's majority as members and are co-op-
erating with the state's administration in important aspects (e.g. religious education, church 
tax). "Konfessionslosigkeit" is accepted by a rapidly increasing portion of the population. 
In 1991 10.7% of all the Western ALLBUS-respondents had no church membership, in 
1992 12.3%, and the Eurobarometer 39 of 1993 showed already a rise to 14.1% (new fed-
eral states 1991: 64.6%, 1992: 66.3%, 1993: 70.8%). The overall assumption that after the 
end of socialism people would rejoin the "Volkskirchen" is not supported by these data. 
Among the services which are often requested from the traditional churches are basic rites 
of passage for important life stages as death or birth. Looking at the percentages of people 
who have baptized their children or who would like to do so, if they had children, there is 
a gap of about 18 percentage points in the oldest age group (pre-1932; cf. chart 7). Eastern-
ers and Westerners born before "Nationalsozialismus" are much more similar than those 
from the next cohort 1932-1946 (about 48 percentage points). The gap increases still for 
the 1947-1961 age group, primarily due to the decline from 49% to 23% of baptizers in the 
East. A similar East-West-difference exists in the post-1961 cohort. "Baptizing" has be-
come a minority-custom for the Eastern people, whereas the vast Western majority still 
continues in the practice. 
Chart 7: Baptizing Children (Practice and Intention) 
(% Yes by Birth Cohort) 
Respondents in Germany who have not moved between East and West (ALLBUS 1992) 
We might also ask whether those who remained active in the religious life of the GDR 
were more, or less, active than those in the West. In 1991 respondents were also asked, 
how often they used to attend church in their childhood at the age of "eleven or twelve". 
Frequencies for this retrospective report of former church attendance indicate little differ-
ence between respondents in the East and the West, though there is some indication for a 
growing East-West gap in the younger Protestant cohorts (cf. Chart 8). Among Catholics 
we see a moderate declining for the younger age groups, and among the Lutherans a 
stronger decline: between Catholics and Lutherans cohort differences appear to be 
increasing. 
Chart 8: Church Attendance in Childhood at Age " 11 or 12 Years" 
(At Least Once a Month) 
Chart 9 shows former and present belief in God. The old federal states represent a Western 
nation which has not a very wide, but at least a noteworthy spreading of faith (Greeley 
1993b; Terwey 1993). In the two cohorts under 35 years of age about 14% of the respon-
dents have been life-long atheists (cf. the darkest portion in Chart 9). In the next four age 
groups this percentage drops down to half that value, and, as might have been expected, 
among those 75 years and older only a very small number identify themselves in this life-
long atheist category. Interestingly, the number of people who switched to disbelief is 
much larger than that of the constant atheists. This supports the thesis that secularization is 
still going on — not only in the respect of formal church-integration, but also in the respect 
of rejecting traditional forms of central metaphysical beliefs. The cohorts of those who 
switched from disbelief to belief are much smaller, except for respondents aged 65 years 
and older. Besides that, there is little indication for a consistent increase in the tendency to 
switch toward religious belief as people get older. The white part of the chart finally shows 
the proportion of constant believers. Amongst the youngest cohorts, about 50% report 
being life-long believers; this percentage rises to 78% among the older respondents. 
Chart 9: Which Best Describes Your Beliefs about God - Old Federal States 
Chart 10: Which Best Describes Your Beliefs about God - New Federal States 
Atheism in the former GDR has grown more rapidly (cf. Chart 10). The portion of respon-
dents who said that they never believed in God is far greater, especially among the young 
cohorts. Among the older respondents, on the other hand, a substantial number of former 
believers augment the total of non-believers. It is clear from the information in Charts 9 
and 10 that the overall decline of faith among the Eastern young cohorts is much steeper 
than in Western Germany. Although the proportion of life-long believers rises by age, there 
is little variation in the proportion of new believers. All in all, only 24.6% of the new Ger-
man citizens have a persisting faith in God, while 67.3% of those in the old federal states 
believe in God. Analysing the same question for Russia (ISSP 1991), Greeley (1993a) has 
shown much larger percentages of people who switched from atheism to belief, especially 
amongst the younger cohorts. Secularizing influences of socialist ideology and government 
do not necessarily produce similar religious results in each nation. To some extent, Ortho-
dox and Catholic backgrounds have given stronger support to religious persistence than 
Protestantism in the German East (cf. Greeley 1993a, 1993b; Terwey 1993). 
Besides the basic idea of God, several other assumptions are more or less well accepted in 
dominant Christian traditions. Out of various possible issues, we focus on belief in hell, life 
after death, and miracles (cf. chart 11). In each instance, Eastern respondents are less often 
convinced of these phenomena. On the other hand, there are some interesting similarities 
between East and West. In both parts, people more often tend to believe in life after death 
than in hell. 
This suggests that, for all age groups, Germans are inclined to accept positive, rather than 
negative, expectations about post-mortal life (cf. also Terwey 1992). The acceptance of hell 
in the East cannot sink much lower, but also conviction of life after death is for all cohorts 
less often observed than even the Western conviction of hell. The lines for belief in life af-
ter death and for belief in miracles are quite close in the old federal states.8 Nevertheless, a 
striking characteristic in Chart 11 is the rather wide spread belief in miracles which is 
found in the East. Moreover, higher percentages of belief are again often to be observed 
among the very youngest people contrasting to middle aged groups. Although this might 
reflect a "family effect", the "returning effect" hypothesis might be more appealing in 
this instance. 
8 We do not want to comment on the decline of belief in life after death in the rather small Western cohort 
of 75+. As we have seen up to now in almost every respect, rather old people tend to be religious 
believers. To interpret this singular deviation as some kind of disappointment or anything like that would 
be to daring until further evidence is found. 
Chart 11: Belief in Life after Death, Hell, and Miracles 
3. Alternative Forms of Belief in the German Society of the Nineties 
In the following part of the paper we go beyond the scope of traditional churches and Chris-
9 
tian beliefs. Are people believing in God noticeably more often "superstitious" than athe-
ists? If the empirical answer to this question is "yes", the sociology of religion would be 
rather simple in this respect. A simple secularization model assumes that there are two 
types of individuals. The first tends to belief in the supernatural, transcendency, meta-
physics, miraculous events, fate, luck, and so forth. Individuals of the second type are 
rational, scientific, and secular in their worldview. A functional definition of religion, how-
ever, allows for other "types" which are equally plausible: e.g., individuals, who are alien-
9     In order to avoid a priori negative connotations we shall substitute the term "superstition" by 
"alternative forms of belief'. 
ated from the central forms of accepted religion and have turned to alternative forms of be-
lief as a substitute. As in our previous analysis of ALLBUS items, we again control for age 
and East-West-differences. 
Among Easterners, 34% of the respondents giving valid answers assume that good luck 
charms at least probably bring good luck (Glücksbringer bringen manchmal tatsachlich 
Glück), while 30% of all Western respondents hold this view. Considering the substantial 
meaning of this item, these percentages appear to be rather high. At least "Glücksbringer" 
could be expected to be out of date in a nation educated in the tradition of rational science. 
Contrary to our findings about accepted church practice and traditional beliefs, the overall 
frequency of inclining towards good luck charms is even a little higher in the East than in 
the West of Germany. It seems that Socialism has even left a little more leeway for this in-
clination than for today's belief in God. 
We observe analogous patterns for different age groups in each of the regions - among 
believers and atheists the highest rates of this alternative belief is to be found in the young-
est cohort, irrespective of the East-West differentiation. Beyond that, percentages decrease 
more clearly among the older Western cohorts than among those in the East. 
Chart 12: Good Luck Charms Do Bring Good Luck 
(% Yes or Probably Yes) 
Respondents in Germany who have not moved between East and West (ALLBUS-Basisumfrage 1991) 
Given this age-related pattern with regard to good luck charms, we might also expect that 
other forms of alternative beliefs are distributed in a similar pattern. Those who believe in 
the "enchantment" and "supernatural powers" of things, may also believe in clairvoyance 
and other "supernatural powers" of humans. It might be more plausible to confer such pow-
ers to human spirits than to lifeless things. Such expectations, however, are not confirmed 
by the data about fortune tellers' ability to foresee the future (Es gibt Wahrsager, die die 
Zukunft wirklich vorhersehen können). In the new federal states fortune tellers have pres-
ently a smaller fraction of adherents (22%) than do the fortune tellers in the West (31%). 
Interestingly, belief in fortune tellers among the Western respondents is nearly at the same 
level as their belief in good luck charms. 
The pattern of lower percentages in the older cohorts is barely apparent from Chart 13. 
There is a slight indication that acceptance of this alternative belief is more often found 
among young people. 
Chart 13: Some Fortune Tellers Can Really Foresee Future 
(% Yes or Probably Yes) 
Respondents in Germany who have not moved between East and West (ALLBUS-Basisumfrage 1991) 
Another capacity ascribed to some humans is the "supernatural power" of faithhealers 
(Manche Wunderheiler verfügen wirklich über übernatürliche Kräfte). In the West, 37% of 
the valid respondents reply that some persons may have such powers, while 39% of the 
Eastern respondents believe that such supernatural powers exist. As we can see, this form 
of alternative belief is even more wide spread than belief in fortune tellers. Looking gener-
ally at the data, there are relatively few differences between respondents in the East and 
West, although religious believers in the new federal states appear to be marginally more 
disposed than the other groups to accept this alternative belief. 
The age differences shown in Chart 14 appear to be even less systematic than those for 
fortune tellers. Among atheists there are nearly no differences between the age groups. 
Among believers, on the other hand, there does appear to be some indication that younger 
people are more likely to accept the personal powers of "Wunderheiler". 
Chart 14: Some Faithhealers Really Do Have Supernatural Powers 
(% Yes or Probably Yes) 
Respondents in Germany who have not moved between East and West (ALLBUS-Basisumfrage 1991) 
The last form of alternative belief that we examine is that of astrology. A brief look into 
many newspapers suggests that astrology is a very popular form of alternative beliefs, 
which may appear in more or less sophisticated variants. As with fortune telling, accep-
tance of astrology seems to be stronger in the West than in the East; 31% of all Westerners' 
valid responses, and 23% of those in the East, are positive about the statement that persons' 
star signs or horoscopes have effects on their life (Das Sternzeichen bzw. das Geburts-
horoskop eines Menschen hat einen Einfluß auf den Verlauf seines Lebens). Given the high 
public visibility of this special alternative belief, it is somewhat surprising that these per-
centages are not higher than the other general percentages already introduced in this 
section.10 
10   Perhaps the implication of a causal influence excerted by the stars has reduced the acceptance of the 
astrological item a little. Some adherents of mystics refuse a causal influence of stars on life, but they 
accept synchronous occurrences of the astrological kind. 
Chart 15: Stars Signs or Horoscope Have an Influence on Life 
(% Yes or Probably Yes) 
Respondents in Germany who have not moved between East and West (ALLBUS-Basisumfrage 1991) 
Among Western respondents who believe in God, the percentage reporting belief in horo-
scopes declines over the first three cohorts, but those who are over 59 years of age nearly 
equal the percentage level of believers under 30 (33% vs. 36%). Atheists in the old federal 
states show a clear pattern of belief in astrology declining by age. Among Eastern respon-
dents, the only clear pattern is that those who believe in God are also more often inclined 
to astrology than are atheists. 
Among the four forms of "superstition"-items available in the ALLBUS-data astrology can 
be regarded as coming closest to having some kind of religious function. It may be in-
cluded in everyday's life and it is not necessarily tied to exceptional personal abilities of 
healers or fortune tellers. Interest in predictions about a person's future derived from some 
more or less observable combination of natural circumstances are part of a solution to the 
problems of an elementary uncertainty ("Kontingenz"; cf. amongst others Pollack 1990: 
113), which according to some definitions constitutes the religious character of a belief 
system. Astrologists may mediate between individual fate and a general cosmic situation or 
transcendent powers without claiming own personal magic. Their undertakings aim at 
some kind of explanation and solution of basic personal problems. There may be no 
"Church of magic" 11 , but astrology sometimes comes closer to it than many other alterna-
tive convictions or practices. It has even a rather large German organization and at least 
some regular clients. 
According to some results of Schneider (1991), our four items concerning alternative 
forms of belief do not show a simple common relationship to fixed types of people who are 
generally superstitious, even though exploratory data analysis suggests some common 
factor (cf. Terwey 1992: 71). To examine the possibility of more complex relationships, we 
turn next to a set of logistic regressions in which these alternative beliefs serve as the de-
pendent variables. 
Gender and education appear to be related to all of our indicators for alternative beliefs; 
women and less well educated persons tend to accept such phenomena (cf. Table 1). In this 
respect there are some similarities to the prediction of belief in God (cf. Terwey 1992). 
Also, as we saw earlier, age is connected to belief in good luck charms for both parts of 
Germany. Another age effect is indicated by an interaction term for faith healers in the old 
federal states — it appears that in the old federal states, older people are less likely than 
younger people to assume the real existence of faith healers. 
Abercrombie et al. (1970) found in their English interview data that there is a genuinely 
counter-superstitious influence of church participation. Corresponding results are shown 
for New Age assumptions in three German cities by Schneider (1991). After controlling 
for church attendance German Catholics and Lutherans do not have a significantly higher 
probability than those with no church membership for adhering to any of the four alterna-
tive beliefs. Similar to the results of Abercrombie et al. and Schneider (1991), we find that 
there is no significant estimation for regular church-goers to be less inclined to alternative 
forms than those who never attend. Interestingly, it appears that we are most likely to find 
believers in these alternative forms among those who attend church services at least some 
of the time. There are significant effects for good luck charms and — more clearly - for 
astrology. Finally, Westerners with low church attendance are more often persuaded of star 
signs than respondents in the East (cf. significant interaction effect for church attendance in 
Table 1). But if some tentative results of Schneider (1991: 66) are correct, half of all regu-
lar church-goers sampled in three cities pronounce a desire for "new religiosity" ("Neue 
Religiosität"). Therefore, Schneider (1991: 67) concludes: high church integration does not 
11 "To be sure, the belief in magic is always more or less general; it is very frequently diffused in large 
masses of the population ... But it does not result in binding together those, who adhere to it, nor in 
uniting them into a group leading a common life. There is no Church of magic." (Durkheim 1961: 60) 
Following Durkheim's "Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" and Mandelbaum (1966), Stark and 
Bainbridge (1987: 108) apply this argument even to Buddhist and Hindu cultures. 
12 The results of Schneider 1991 suggest that "New Age" is a some relevant part of the belief system in the 
old federal states. Such New Age assumptions also rely in many respects on astrology (e.g. the age of 
aquarius). 
necessarily mean opposition to all dimensions of "New Age-spirituality" ("New Age Spiri-
tualität"). 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Alternative Belief Equations ('Probably Not 
True' and 'Definitely Not True' Coded as 1; Catholics, Lutherans, and persons 
without any church-membership; Germany 1991) 
Alternative forms of belief apparently persist in the Germanies today. A "God of the Gaps" 
may serve to fill gaps between people's desires and what is in fact possible (Abercrombie 
et al. 1970). A similar perspective is developed by Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 106), who 
claim that religious specialists in the traditional, highly institutionalized churches will, over 
time, tend to reduce the amount of "magic" they supply. If the demand for "magic" contin-
ues, other cultural specialists, they argue, will specialize in providing it. Alternative beliefs 
may spread in times of anxiety, lost faith or uncertainty. People often look for horoscopes 
when they feel insecure about their future or environment and need encouragement. Fol-
lowing Abercrombie et al. (1970: 101), it is noticeably that stars columns tend to be opti-
mistic. Such predictions would often lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. If a person is told to 
have a positive constellation for the day to follow, this person probably is more motivated 
to look out for chances and may try harder to be really successful. 
A rather high degree of alternative belief in the new federal states could perhaps be con-
nected with widespread present wants and scarcities in this part of Germany after unifica-
tion (Mreschar 1992). Certainly, further evidence would be needed for such far-reaching 
assumptions. Durkheim (1960: 272 - 285) already suggested a link between economical 
crises, social pessimism, and religion. As some anxieties about the future are growing at 
least in the Western part of Germany 13 , changing trends in German religion may ensue 
(e.g.: strive for accepted or alternative "compensators" (Stark and Bainbridge 1987: 36); 
traditional religious groups having lower tension with external society (cf. the Volkskirchen 
in the former BRD) or groups who are in sectlike tension with the sociocultural environ-
ment (Stark and Bainbridge 1987: 122- 125,311)). 
The unity of Christian belief and church has not always been as persistent and streamlined 
as some of the secularization analysts have assumed (cf. Stark and Bainbridge 1984: 110 
ff.; Finke and Stark 1992; Gabriel 1992, 1993; Schmied 1993; Tyrell 1993), but the rap-
idly growing number of people leaving German Churches indicates a severe instability of 
the traditional forms of German religious organizations. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, the outcome may even be a majority of unchurched atheists. Another possible 
outcome may be a change to a more open religious market structure such as that found in 
the U.S. (Finke and Stark 1992). The decline of religious monopolies connected with 
government regulations might finally result in even higher rates of church attendance and 
religious belief as Iannaccone (1990) asserts. The high religiosity in the U.S. society (cf. 
Greeley 1989; Finke and Stark 1992; Terwey 1993; Warner 1993) is quite contrary to 
what simple secularization theories would predict even though this picture may be exagger-
ated by some poll data (cf. Hadaway et al. 1993). 
13   "In spite of what some people say, the situation of the average man is not getting better, but worse." In 
ALLBUS 1982 62.4% agreed with this pessimistic item — this was already a critical year, when the 
German government was taken over by the conservative-liberal coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. The 
former SPD-FDP coalition was less and less expected to cope with some social problems (cf. Gibowski 
and Kaase 1986; Küihnel and Terwey 1990; Terwey 1990). After 1982 social pessimism in the West 
changed to 54.2% (ALLBUS 1990), 59% (ALLBUS 1991), and 70.8% (ALLBUS 1992; East: 66.4% 
(1991), 66.1% (1992)). 
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